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LLMs won't break symmetric crypto

JP Aumasson· ·5 min read · 0 reactions · 0 comments · 10 views
LLMs won't break symmetric crypto
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Except for the toy version HAWK-256 whose 64-bit security is practically breakable, the new attack is not practical. But it's a meaningful break of HAWK’s security, as it reduces the estimated security level of HAWK-512 from its 128-bit target to at most 108 bits and, speculatively, as little as 81 (see Appendix C of the paper.)An improved key-recovery attack on 7-round AES-128, while the full version does 10 rounds. The attack is , and totally not a surprise, posing no threat to AES.

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Hacker News (Front Page) files mainly under programming. We currently carry 1,191 of its stories. Top-voted stories on Hacker News.

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Hacker News (Front Page) · JP Aumasson
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Original publisherHacker News (Front Page)
Canonical URLhttps://www.bfswa.blog/p/llms-wont-break-symmetric-crypto
Publication timeThu, 06 Aug 2026 01:39:06 +0000
Retrieval time2026-08-06T02:10:43.678Z
Last seen2026-08-06T02:10:43.678Z
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Opening excerpt (first ~120 words) tap to expand

LLMs won't break symmetric cryptoAnd Anthropic's cryptanalysis work is greatJul 31, 20265ShareOn July 28th Anthropic announced new cryptanalytic attacks discovered using their LLM Claude Mythos: A key-recovery attack on HAWK, a post-quantum signature scheme candidate in NIST’s “Additional Digital Signatures” standardization project. Except for the toy version HAWK-256 whose 64-bit security is practically breakable, the new attack is not practical. But it's a meaningful break of HAWK’s security, as it reduces the estimated security level of HAWK-512 from its 128-bit target to at most 108 bits and, speculatively, as little as 81 (see Appendix C of the paper.)An improved key-recovery attack on 7-round AES-128, while the full version does 10 rounds.

Excerpt limited to ~120 words for fair-use compliance. The full article is at Hacker News (Front Page).

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