The LLM never writes the query: declarative search layer over sensitive records
An internal assistant tool allows staff to search sensitive records using plain language requests. The tool translates these requests into specific search criteria while ensuring data security and access permissions. This system prevents unauthorized data access by using a fixed vocabulary for search parameters instead of a free-form query language.
- ▪The assistant tool enables staff to find sensitive records by typing requests in plain language.
- ▪It uses a fixed vocabulary to ensure that only authorized fields are searchable by each user.
- ▪The system is designed to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive data by validating search criteria against a registry.
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Story provenance
Attribution is not the same as permission. This drawer separates discovery metadata, excerpts, WeSearch-generated summaries, reuse status, and whether the publisher receives the visit. Nothing here claims a legal grant the publisher has not made.
Record
| Original publisher | Alec Jude Wilson |
| Canonical URL | https://judes.club/writing/the-llm-never-writes-the-query/ |
| Publication time | Thu, 21 May 2026 20:26:27 +0000 |
| Retrieval time | 2026-05-21T20:31:35.748Z |
| Last seen | 2026-05-21T20:31:35.748Z |
| Headline source | Publisher (no WeSearch rewrite) |
| Excerpt source | publisher body |
| Excerpt method | First ~120 words (~800 chars) of extracted publisher body, fair-use limited. |
| Summary | WeSearch · cerebras-chat (WeSearch summarizer) |
| Summary source text | contentText |
| Citation coverage | Summary is a WeSearch-generated derivative; primary citation is the original publisher URL. |
| Cluster | qsmtUVatGN8K |
| Cluster logic | Grouped by semantic title/content similarity across sources within a rolling window. Same-publisher template collisions are excluded from coverage comparison. |
| Ranking reason | Story pages are not engagement-ranked. Hub feeds use recency, with optional source-diversified chronological ordering (cap consecutive stories per source). No personalized ranking. |
| Publisher visit | Yes — open original |
| Substitutes article? | No — link-out required for full text |
Rights status (four layers)
WeSearch handling by dimension
| Indexing | May the item be indexed (stored, ranked, made findable)? | Allowed |
| Snippet | May a short excerpt of the publisher's text be shown? | Allowed |
| AI summary | May WeSearch generate its own short summary of the article? | Limited |
| Retrieval / RAG | May the content be exposed for third-party retrieval-augmented generation? | Not asserted |
| Model training | May the content be used to train AI models? | Not asserted |
| Commercial reuse | May the content be reused commercially? | Not permitted |
Basis: Derived from the published RSS/Atom feed. Contact: [email protected]. Reviewed: 2026-07-24.
Opening excerpt (first ~120 words) tap to expand
← All writing The LLM never writes the query: a declarative search layer over sensitive records May 21, 2026 14 min read ai · architecture · engineering We have an internal assistant. One of the things it does is find people. By people I mean records in a system of record — names, contacts, home addresses, current assignments, and other personal details that exist in exactly one place and actually matter. This is the most sensitive data we hold. Staff can search it by typing a request in plain language, such as “find translators in France who speak Spanish,” and getting an answer back. The model handles the request itself without much trouble. This post is about what happens between the request and the answer. The setup First, some background on what the assistant is.
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Excerpt limited to ~120 words for fair-use compliance. The full article is at Alec Jude Wilson.