The solution the supply chain problems is removing your deps from .gitignore
The article discusses a proposed solution to supply chain attacks in software development. It suggests that developers should check in their dependencies directly into version control instead of ignoring them, which could significantly reduce the attack surface. The author argues that this approach would make dependency management more transparent and less prone to exploitation.
- ▪Supply chain attacks could be mitigated by checking in dependencies into version control.
- ▪Removing vendor/ node_modules/ and venv/ from .gitignore can eliminate 99% of the attack surface.
- ▪The author criticizes the common practice of relying on automated dependency updates and suggests that it can introduce vulnerabilities.
5 outlets in our directory ran this story, first to last over 31 hours. All of the coverage we found sits in one bucket: centre. That one-sidedness is itself worth noticing.
- ▪ The solution to all the supply chain problems is removing your dependencies from .gitignore — Reddit
- ▪ The solution to all the supply chain problems is removing your dependencies from .gitignore — r/PHP
- ▪ Every (major) supply chain in the world — Hacker News (Newest)
- ▪ Dependencies and supply chain risk — r/rust
Hacker News (Newest) files mainly under programming. We currently carry 5,306 of its stories.
Story provenance
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Story provenance
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Record
| Original publisher | Ycombinator |
| Canonical URL | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48253062 |
| Publication time | Sun, 24 May 2026 00:31:06 +0000 |
| Retrieval time | 2026-05-24T01:07:28.629Z |
| Last seen | 2026-05-24T01:07:28.629Z |
| Headline source | Publisher (no WeSearch rewrite) |
| Excerpt source | publisher body |
| Excerpt method | First ~120 words (~800 chars) of extracted publisher body, fair-use limited. |
| Summary | WeSearch · cerebras-chat (WeSearch summarizer) |
| Summary source text | contentText |
| Citation coverage | Summary is a WeSearch-generated derivative; primary citation is the original publisher URL. |
| Cluster | uY6MOCvP4sFz · 5 stories |
| Cluster logic | Grouped by semantic title/content similarity across sources within a rolling window. Same-publisher template collisions are excluded from coverage comparison. |
| Ranking reason | Story pages are not engagement-ranked. Hub feeds use recency, with optional source-diversified chronological ordering (cap consecutive stories per source). No personalized ranking. |
| Publisher visit | Yes — open original |
| Substitutes article? | No — link-out required for full text |
Rights status (four layers)
WeSearch handling by dimension
| Indexing | May the item be indexed (stored, ranked, made findable)? | Allowed |
| Snippet | May a short excerpt of the publisher's text be shown? | Allowed |
| AI summary | May WeSearch generate its own short summary of the article? | Limited |
| Retrieval / RAG | May the content be exposed for third-party retrieval-augmented generation? | Not asserted |
| Model training | May the content be used to train AI models? | Not asserted |
| Commercial reuse | May the content be reused commercially? | Not permitted |
Basis: Derived from the published RSS/Atom feed. Contact: [email protected]. Reviewed: 2026-07-24.
Opening excerpt (first ~120 words) tap to expand
I head the major realisation today that we've all been bamboozled.All the supply chain attacks currently happening would never even happen if we just checked in our language-respective vendor/node_modules/venv directories into git and just deployed straight from that.Screw the dependency install and upgrade step. Screw the automated build step. Screw the breaking changes because $package_owner doesnt adhere to semver.Checking in dependencies and their updates individually is, and has always been the way out of this mess.Remove vendor/ node_modules/ and venv/ from your .gitignore today and skip the install step in your CI and you eliminate 99% of the attack surface instantly. Was it always that easy???? I think it was!You think checking in your composer.lock or package.lock saves you? Hah.
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Excerpt limited to ~120 words for fair-use compliance. The full article is at Ycombinator.